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GROUNDING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE 
EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN ABUSED BY THEIR INTIMATE PARTNERS  
 
Janet E. Mosher* 
 
For women seeking to extricate themselves from the web of entrapment woven 
together by the multiple threads that make up the coercive control repertoire of 
their abusive intimate partners, it is often difficult to avoid engagement with legal 
systems. Yet, the legal systems they encounter—criminal, family, child welfare, 
immigration among them—are frequently unwelcoming (if not hostile), 
controlling, demeaning, fragmented and contradictory. While there has been a 
recent explosion of interest in “access to justice,” little attention has been paid to 
how we might conceptualize access to justice in a manner that speaks 
meaningfully to the circumstances of women who experience abuse in their 
intimate relationships. For such women, access to justice is curtailed not only by 
lack of representation, delays, costs, and procedural complexities—the obstacles 
commonly associated with access to justice failings—but by three inter-related 
phenomena: the enduring hold of an incident-based understanding of domestic 
violence; the failure of legal actors to curb men’s strategic use of legal systems to 
further their power; and the host of complications—contradictory expectations, 
inconsistent orders, repetitious proceedings, sweeping surveillance—that arise 
when women are compelled to navigate multiple intersecting legal systems. What 
is required, I argue, is a conceptualization of access to justice that places 
women’s safety and well-being at its core.  
 
Dans la plupart des cas, les femmes qui veulent se sortir de l’enfer de la violence 
conjugale et échapper au contrôle de leur conjoint abusif n’ont d’autre choix que 
de se tourner vers les systèmes judiciaires. Pourtant, ceux qui s’offrent à elles, 
que ce soit en matière criminelle ou familiale, ou encore en matière 
d’immigration ou de protection de l’enfance, sont souvent peu accueillants (sinon 
hostiles), en plus d’être contrôlants, rabaissants, fragmentés et contradictoires. 
Malgré le très grand intérêt que suscite depuis quelque temps l’accès à la justice, 
une attention dérisoire a été accordée à la façon de conceptualiser cet accès afin 
de vraiment aider les femmes aux prises avec la violence conjugale. Pour ces 
femmes, l’accès à la justice est entravé non seulement par des services de 
représentation inadéquats ainsi que par les délais, les coûts et les complexités liés 
à la procédure, soit les obstacles habituellement associés aux failles de l’accès à 
la justice, mais également par trois phénomènes interdépendants : une perception 
tenace de la violence familiale axée sur l’incident; l’incapacité des intervenants 
juridiques de freiner les hommes qui se servent astucieusement des systèmes 
                                                            
*  Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. This paper was delivered as the 2014-2015 Windsor Yearbook 
Distinguished Lecture in Access to Justice. 
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judiciaires pour accroître leur domination et la myriade de complications – 
attentes contradictoires, ordonnances incompatibles, procédures répétitives, 
surveillance envahissante – qui surviennent lorsque les femmes doivent naviguer 
dans les méandres de plusieurs systèmes judiciaires qui s’entrecroisent. À mon 
avis, il est impératif de parvenir à une conceptualisation de l’accès à la justice 
qui est axée d’abord et avant tout sur la sécurité et le bien-être des femmes.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
There has been an explosion of interest in access to justice over the past half dozen years or so, 
accompanied by a commonly heard refrain that a “crisis” exists.1 Yet, among the many recent 
reports and interventions, a gendered analysis has been largely absent.2 In the article that follows, 
I seek to offer some insights into a conceptualization of access to justice from the perspective of 
women abused in their intimate relationships.3 While women encounter many of the “obstacles” 
                                                            
1  The cause has been taken up by senior members of the bar and bench, including Chief Justice McLachlin and 
Governor General Johnston, see Hon Beverley McLachlin, PC, “The Challenges We Face” (remarks delivered 
at the Empire Club of Canada, 8 March 2007), Supreme Court of Canada <www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-
cour/judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2007-03-08-eng.aspx>; Hon David Johnston (remarks delivered at the Canadian 
Bar Association’s Canadian Legal Conference, The Legal Profession in a Smart and Caring Nation: A Vision 
for 2017, 14 August 2011), online: Governor General <www.gg.ca/document.aspx?id=14195>. Among the 
many recent reports on access to justice are those of the Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and 
Family Matters, Access to Civil & Family Justice: A Roadmap for Change (October 2013), online: Canadian 
Forum on Civil Justice <www.cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2013/AC_Report_English_Final.pdf> 
[Roadmap for Change]; the Law Commission of Ontario (LCO), Increasing Access to Family Justice Through 
Comprehensive Entry Points and Inclusivity (Toronto: February 2013), online: <www.lco-cdo.org/family-law-
reform-final-report.pdf> [Increasing Access]; BC Legal Services Society, Making Justice Work: Improving 
Access and Outcomes for British Columbians (July 2012), online: Legal Services Society 
<www.lss.bc.ca/assets/about-Us/reports/submissions/makingJusticeWork.pdf> [Making Justice Work]; 
Canadian Bar Association’s (CBA) Access to Justice Committee, Reaching Equal Justice: An Invitation to 
Envision and Act (CBA, November 2013), online: Canadian Bar Association 
<www.cba.org/CBA/equaljustice/secure_pdf/EqualJusticeFinalReport-eng.pdf> [Reaching Equal Justice]. 
2  Among recent reports on access to justice, the report of the LCO, Increasing Access, supra note 1, provides the 
most sustained attention to gender, identifies some of the particular challenges faced by survivors of domestic 
violence, and underscores the importance of developing the family law system’s capacity to respond to the 
existence of domestic violence. 
3  Reaching Equal Justice, supra note 1. In this report, the CBA urges a shift in perspective from justice system 
insiders to “users,” a shift that flows from embracing a “truly equal justice system” as its animating principle, 
and from its vision of a justice system that “provides meaningful and effective access to all, taking into account 
the diverse lives that people live.” The CBA describes its initiative as focused “on human justice, on people law 
– legal issues, problems and disputes experienced by people (including small businesses), especially those that 
involve essential legal needs. We understand essential legal needs to be those arising from legal problems or 
situations that put into jeopardy the security of a person or that person’s family’s security – including liberty, 
personal security, health, employment, housing or ability to meet the basic necessities of life and extending to 
other urgent legal needs” (at 9).  A shift in focus upon users has also spawned empirical work to ascertain legal 
needs and a literature that has served to highlight their often cascading nature and their human cost. See e.g. Ab 
Currie, The Legal Problems of Everyday Life: The Nature, Extent and Consequences of Justiciable Problems 
Experienced by Canadians (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2009), online: Department of Justice 
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routinely identified in the literature – lack of representation, delays, costs, and procedural 
complexities – much more is going on that impedes their access to justice. Women’s access to 
justice is additionally curtailed by three inter-related phenomena: the enduring hold of an 
incident-based understanding of domestic violence; the failure of legal actors to curb men’s 
strategic use of legal systems to further their power; and the host of complications that arise 
when women must navigate multiple intersecting legal systems.4  
 Most fundamentally, access to justice requires that all legal system actors – lawyers, judges, 
administrative decision makers and adjudicators, assessors, and mediators – have a nuanced 
understanding of the phenomenon of domestic violence.5 Significantly, this requirement 
necessitates moving beyond the reductive, incident-based understanding of domestic violence 
that continues to dominate in the legal realm, an approach that all too frequently silences 
women’s narratives of abuse, minimizes the harms perpetrated against them, and renders 
accessing legal systems as anything but a positive, justice-enhancing experience. Rather, a deep 
appreciation of domestic violence – and of how it is deployed by individual men and enabled by 
social structures and institutions, law included – is critical. These structures include the 
overlapping systems of oppression that operate not only to render some women more vulnerable 
to violence and with fewer resources to exit relationships, but also to construct only some women 
as “victims” deserving of legal redress.  
 Meaningful access to justice for women – “justice for all”  – will remain elusive unless and 
until a nuanced understanding of domestic violence is widely shared among system actors.6 The 
Honourable Donna Martinson, a retired judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court, has put it 
this way:  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/rr07_la1-rr07_aj1/rr07_la1.pdf>; Ab Currie, “A National Survey of 
the Civil Justice Problems of Low and Moderate Income Canadians: Incidence and Patterns” (Ottawa: 
Department of Justice, 2005), online: Canadian Forum on Civil Justice <www.cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/de-
fault/files/docs/2006/currie-en.pdf>; R Roy McMurtry et al, Listening to Ontarians: Report of the Ontario Civil 
Legal Needs Project (Toronto: Ontario Civil Needs Project Steering Committee, 2010), online: Law Society of 
Upper Canada <www.lsuc.on.ca/media/may3110_oclnreport_final.pdf>. 
4  I use the term “legal systems” to refer to various domains of substantive and procedural law: the criminal justice 
system, the child welfare system, the family law system, and so on. I am interested not only in the adjudicative 
or other dispute resolution processes within these various systems but also in their substantive legal content. 
5  There is much debate about the terminology to capture experiences of abuse in intimate relationships, and, of 
course, the language we use matters as it serves to organize and construct meaning. For a detailed discussion, 
see Gillian Walker, Family Violence and the Women’s Movement (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990). 
While some object to the term “domestic violence” because it fails to signal that women are its primary victims 
and men its perpetrators, others take the opposite view, arguing that domestic violence is widely understood as 
code for the violence perpetrated by men in intimate heterosexual relationships, and, as such, obscures the abuse 
in same sex relationships. Although imperfect, I use the term “domestic violence” here; my discussion is 
focused largely on the coercive control enacted by men in the context of intimate heterosexual relationships and 
enabled by, among other things, gender inequality. I consider “domestic violence” as a form of “gender 
violence” in the sense conveyed by Sally Merry – that is, where “violence” (another contested term and 
discussed more fully infra) is used to police/enforce particular performances of gender. See Sally Engle Merry, 
Gender Violence: A Cultural Perspective (Chicester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008). 
6  Stephanie Sweetnam, “Where Do You Think Domestic Abuse Hurts Most?” (2013) 19:1 Violence Against 
Women 133 at 136.  
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Meaningful access to justice requires more than just providing women and children 
with access to any lawyer, or any judge. The justice part of access to justice requires 
that those lawyers and judges dealing with family law cases and criminal law cases 
have the interest in, aptitude for, and the professional experience and expertise 
required to deal with the complexities of, and multifaceted nature of, IPV [intimate 
partner violence] cases.7 
 
Moreover, without this understanding, it is difficult for legal system actors to see when and how 
abusive (ex)partners use and manipulate legal processes and systems to work harm. Often 
masquerading as steps taken to access justice, abusive partners initiate and pursue private law 
litigation – family law litigation, in particular – to further their power and control. Also 
important to appreciate is that, beyond litigation, coercive controllers strategically engage the 
power of various legal systems to extend their own power. They threaten (and some individuals 
act on these threats) to call the police to have their partners charged, to revoke immigration 
sponsorships, to make anonymous tips to social assistance authorities to prompt fraud 
investigations, or to complain to child welfare authorities about their partners’ neglect or abuse 
of the children. The engagement of any one of these systems will trigger not only an 
investigation but also often the involvement of other legal systems. For example, a call to the 
police will usually prompt a report to child protection services and, for women without 
permanent residence status, to Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC]. In these 
circumstances, women’s engagement with these multiple legal systems is not a vindication of 
access to justice; rather, based on spurious allegations women are drawn in and compelled to 
participate. Women may have access to a legal forum or process, but not access to justice.8  
 As noted, particular access to justice concerns arise from the complex interplay between any 
number of combinations possible between, for example, the criminal, family, child welfare, 
immigration, and social assistance legal systems. These concerns are many and varied: multiple 
and repetitive court attendances; conflicting court orders; contradictory system expectations; and 
compromised safety when legal system actors fail to share information. The limited literature 
elucidating the access to justice issues at the intersections of these multiple legal systems 
consistently calls for greater communication and collaboration within and across systems. I 
                                                            
7  Hon Donna J Martinson, “Multiple Court Proceedings and Intimate Partner Violence: A Dangerous Disconnect” 
(keynote address delivered at the Canadian Observatory on the Justice System’s Responses to Intimate Partner 
Violence National Conference, University of New Brunswick, 21 October 2014) at 3, online: University of New 
Brunswick <www.unb.ca/conferences/mmfc2014/_resources/presentations/donna-martinson-keynote.pdf>. 
8  Access to justice is often equated with access to the mechanisms of institutionalized dispute resolution, such as 
courts and tribunals. Broader conceptualizations place emphasis on “justice,” casting a critical lens on the 
content of the substantive law, the ability of decision makers to genuinely understand the experiences of others, 
and distributions of power that create unequal access not only to legal literacy but to credibility, autonomy, and 
respect. It is this latter conceptualization that informs my analysis. See Janet Mosher “Lessons in Access to 
Justice: Racialized Youths in Ontario’s Safe Schools” (2008) 46:4 Osgoode Hall L Rev 807; Janice Gross-Stein 
& Adam Cook, “Speaking the Language of Access to Justice: A New Legal Vernacular” in Julia Bass, WA 
Bogart & Frederick Zemans, eds, Access to Justice for a New Century: The Way Forward (Toronto: Law 
Society of Upper Canada, 2005). 
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suggest that caution is needed here; enhanced system collaboration and communication do not 
work invariably to enhance women’s access to justice.  
 As many proponents suggest, this approach may well serve to avoid conflicting orders, reduce 
the number of court hearings, facilitate better risk assessments, and even minimize the abuse of 
court processes. However, we need to attend to the reality that many of these systems, in fact, do 
routinely communicate with each other, but they do so with a view to cutting women off and 
turning them out, rather than to enhancing their safety or meeting their needs. Indeed, this cross-
system communication is precisely why many women – particularly those who are the most 
socially vulnerable and marginalized – assiduously avoid these legal systems. And, no doubt, this 
has significant implications for women’s access to substantive justice. What is required, I 
suggest, is a conceptualization of access to justice that places women’s safety and well-being at 
its core. 
 
II. IMPEDIMENTS TO ABUSED WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE  
 
A. The Limitations of an Incident-Based Approach 
 The limitations of an incident-based approach to domestic violence within the legal system 
have been raised by many academics and activists over a substantial period of time.9 The nub of 
this concern is that within the legal system legal actors focus their attention on discrete incidents 
of physical violence. As Evan Stark has observed, significant numbers of these incidents are 
assessed by legal actors (across a range of legal domains) as being relatively minor because 
seriousness is often calibrated to the extent of the injury inflicted.10 Moreover, “injury” is 
reduced to that which is plainly observable; the bruises, broken bones, and scars. The context in 
which these incidents occur is stripped out, and the often more lasting forms of harm – the 
broken spirits, psyches, and hearts – rendered invisible.  
 Early work by feminists in creating the “Power and Control Wheel” sought to illustrate the 
multiplicity of tactics used by abusers to maintain their domination – among them, isolation, put 
downs and shaming, economic deprivation, intimidation, and the use of the children as pawns.11 
Building upon these early insights, Stark has articulated a theory of coercive control, which he 
describes as 
 
                                                            
9  Linda Neilson, “Partner Abuse, Children and Statutory Change: Cautionary Comments on Women’s Access to 
Justice” (2000) 18 Windsor YB Access Just 115 at 125. Neilson’s observation was derived from a review of the 
case law and specifically focused on judicial understandings of abuse.  
10  Evan Stark, Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007). See also the special volume devoted to engagements with Stark’s theory of coercive control (2009) 15:12 
Violence Against Women.  
11  Duluth Power and Control Wheel, online: Home of the Duluth Model <www.theduluthmodel.org/pdf/power-
andcontrol.pdf>. The wheel has also been adapted by women in various social locations. See eg Sharifa 
Alkahteeb, “Muslim Power and Control Wheel”, online: London Family Court Clinic <www.lf-
cc.on.ca/muslim_wheel_of_domestic_violence.html>; Roe & Jagodinsky, “Power and Control Wheel for 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans Relationships”, online: Texas Council on Family Violence <www.tcfv.org/p-
df/Updated_wheels/LGBT.pdf>. 
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an ongoing pattern of domination by which male abusive partners primarily 
interweave repeated physical and sexual violence with intimidation, sexual 
degradation, isolation and control. The primary outcome of coercive control is a 
condition of entrapment that can be hostage-like in the harms it inflicts on dignity, 
liberty, autonomy and personhood as well as to physical and psychological 
integrity.12  
 
However, he is also clear that coercive control can exist without the presence of physical and 
sexual violence (and, indeed, this was the thrust of his expert evidence in the 2011 Ontario case 
of R. v Craig).13 His work – and that of others – emphasizes the micro-regulation of women’s 
everyday lives: of gendered performances surrounding food preparation, childcare, and 
relationships with friends and family. Emma Williamson’s imagery is evocative here in 
imploring us “not [to focus] on the incidents of abuse … but to understand the nature of 
domination, to focus on the ‘cage.’”14 Also important in Stark’s conceptualization of coercive 
control is how state institutions and structures – among them, inadequate welfare rates, limited 
housing options, precarious immigration status, a gender- and race-stratified labour market, and 
pervasive gender discrimination – facilitate men’s entrapment of women.  
 In the fields of psychology and sociology, significant literature has emerged over the past 
decade that seeks to differentiate between forms of abuse or violence and various topologies 
have been generated.15 Michael Johnson’s work has been perhaps the most influential. While 
Johnson now employs five categories of abuse, the three central categories in his work are: 
“coercive controlling violence” (Johnson originally termed this “intimate terrorism”), 
“situational couple violence,” and “violent resistance.” Johnson’s first category aligns with 
Starks’ model of coercive control. His second category, “situational couple violence,” seeks to 
capture relationships where there are incidents of violence (that may vary markedly in their 
severity) but are not embedded within a larger pattern of control. The third category, “violent 
resistance,” is used primarily by women to defend themselves or to resist coercive controlling 
                                                            
12  Evan Stark, “Re-presenting Battered Women: Coercive Control and the Defense of Liberty” (paper prepared for 
Violence Against Women: Complex Realities and New Issues in a Changing World Conference, Montreal, 
2012), online: The Advocates for Human Rights <www.stopvaw.org/uploads/evan_stark_article_final_1008-
12.pdf> at 7 [unpublished]. 
13  R v Craig, 2011 ONCA 142. 
14  Emma Williamson, “Living in the World of the Domestic Violence Perpetrator: Negotiating the Unreality of 
Coercive Control” (2010) 16:12 Violence Against Women 1412. Coercive control differs from the 
representation of violence in the Power and Control Wheel in that acts of physical and sexual violence are less 
central. In addition, more attention is paid in theories of coercive control to the micro-regulation of everyday 
life and to how men’s power, and women’s corresponding entrapment, is enabled by social structures. 
15  Michael Johnson, A Typology of Domestic Violence: Intimate Terrorism, Violent Resistance and Situational 
Couple Violence (Boston, MA: Northeastern Press, 2008); Michael Johnson, Janel Leone & Yili Xu, “Intimate 
Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence in General Surveys: Ex-Spouses Required” (2014) 20:2 Violence 
Against Women 186; Jane Wangmann, “Different Types of Intimate Partner Violence-An Exploration of the 
Literature” (Australian Domestic & Family Violence Clearinghouse, October 2011), online: Gendered Violence 
Research Network <www.adfvc.unsw.edu.au/PDF%20files/IssuesPaper_22.pdf>. 
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violence.16 Johnson, Stark, and many others posit that coercive control is highly gendered, with 
men overwhelmingly in the category of coercive controllers.17  
 A sizeable literature has also emerged in a number of disciplines that challenges the early 
feminist explanation of violence as being rooted exclusively in a single structure of oppression, 
that of patriarchy. Building on critical race theory and particular strains of feminist scholarship, 
this work theorizes intersecting identities and structures of oppression and places at the centre the 
experiences and voices of racialized, queer, transgendered, Indigenous, newcomer, and other 
marginalized women. In other words, current understandings of domestic violence are much 
more complicated than the unitary picture painted by early feminist work. As Donna Coker 
argues, these insights are important for our understanding not only of the roots of domestic 
violence but also of the structures that limit women’s escape routes.18  
 Deborah Weissman, writing in 2013, echoes concerns raised by many feminist scholars and 
activists in her observation that the law and legal actors have failed to keep pace with these 
changing understandings of domestic violence, continuing to operate on a reductive, incident-
based understanding.19 The failure to situate incidents of physical and sexual abuse within the 
frame of coercive control means that we often under-estimate the risks and severity of harm to 
women and children.20 This failure also produces an extraordinarily limited conception of 
“safety,” wherein safety is equated with a single act – that of separation – a conception that also 
obscures the realities of post-separation violence.21  
                                                            
16  In the area of family law, increased attention is being paid to topologies of violence and their relevance to 
decision making, screening, and the choice of dispute resolution process. While there is much agreement that 
these topologies are relevant and useful, there is a concern that decision makers may too readily categorize the 
violence as “situational couple violence” and that knowledge is not sufficiently advanced for categorizations to 
be confidently made. See Wangmann, supra note 15; Nancy Ver Steegh, “Differentiating Types of Domestic 
Violence: Implications for Child Custody” (2005) 65 La L Rev 179; Linda Neilson, Enhancing Safety: When 
Domestic Violence Cases are in Multiple Legal Systems (Criminal, Family, Child Protection): A Family Law, 
Domestic Violence Perspective, 2nd ed (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2013) at 28, online: Department of 
Justice <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/famil/enhan-renfo/neilson_web.pdf>.  
17  There are deep and acrimonious debates on this point. See eg Michael Johnson, “Gender and Types of Intimate 
Partner Violence: A Response to an Anti-Feminist Literature Review” (2011) 16 Aggression & Violent 
Behavior 289; Joanne Minaker & Laureen Snider, “Husband Abuse: Equality with a Vengeance?” (2006) Can J 
Corr 753; Kristin Anderson, “Gendering Coercive Control” (2009) 15:12 Violence Against Women 444; 
Donald Dutton et al, “The Gender Paradigm in Domestic Violence Research and Practice Part II: The 
Information Website of the American Bar Association” (2009) 14 Aggression & Violent Behavior 30. 
18  Donna Coker, “Transformative Justice: Anti-Subordination Processes in Cases of Domestic Violence” in 
Heather Strange & John Braithwaite, eds, Restorative Justice and Family Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). Coker describes domestic violence as a “social practice maintained by multiple systems 
that operate in the lives of battering men and battered women” (at 128).  
19  Deborah M Weissman, “Law, Social Movements, and the Political Economy of Domestic Violence” (2013) 20 
Duke J Gender L & Pol’y 221. 
20  Stark, supra note 12. 
21  Stark argues that “there is mounting evidence that the level of ‘control’ in abusive relationships is a better 
predictor than prior assaults of future sexual assault and of severe and fatal violence.” See Stark, supra note 12 
at 4. For a review of the literature on post-separation violence, see Molly Dragiewicz & Walter DeKeseredy, 
Study on the Experiences of Abused Women in the Family Courts in Eight Regions in Ontario (Oshawa, ON: 
Luke’s Place Support & Resource Centre for Women & Children, 2008) at 11. 
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 Leigh Goodmark highlights, as do a number of scholars, the equally narrow and problematic 
construction of the “victim” within much legal discourse: passive, meek, and helpless, white and 
middle class.22 The failure to problematize the reigning construction of victimhood also works 
together with the de-contextualization of women’s use of violence, which results in the 
inappropriate charging and conviction of women. While there is limited Canadian research on 
women charged with domestic violence offences, front-line advocates report that the 
overwhelming majority of these women are using “violent resistance,” yet in the incident-based 
focus of the criminal justice system, this context is rarely addressed (often with significant 
consequences for the outcomes in other parts of the legal system).23  
 Across a range of legal domains, while some women report positive experiences, many 
recount how legal system actors have minimized the harms they have experienced, often 
dismissing their accounts as irrelevant, not credible, or as vindictive ploys.24 It is not only that 
the context of coercive control is elided but also that even the acts of physical and sexual 
violence are routinely disregarded. Judith Herman reports that for the women in her study who 
had turned to the criminal justice system the “single greatest shock was the discovery of just how 
                                                            
22  Leigh Goodmark, “Reframing Domestic Violence Law and Policy: An Anti-Essentialist Proposal” (2009) 31 
Wash UJL & Pol’y. See also Adele M Morrison, “Queering Domestic Violence to ‘Straighten Out’ Criminal 
Law: What Might Happen When Queer Theory and Practice Meet Criminal Law’s Conventional Responses to 
Domestic Violence” (2003) 13 S Cal Rev L & Women’s Stud 8; Kae Greenberg, “Still Hidden in the Closet: 
Trans Women and Domestic Violence” (2012) 27 Berkeley J Gender L & Just 198; Kimberle Crenshaw, 
“Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color” (1991) 43 
Stan L Rev 1241; Natalie J Sokoloff & Ida Dupont, “Domestic Violence at the Intersections of Race, Class, and 
Gender: Challenges and Contributions to Understanding Violence Against Marginalized Women in Diverse 
Communities” (2005) 11 Violence Against Women 38; Angela Davis, “The Color of Violence Against 
Women” (keynote address delivered at the Color of Violence Conference, 28 April 2000), online: Colorlines 
<www.colorlines.com/archives/2000/10/the_color_of_violence_against_women.html>. 
23  In the Canadian context, see Cheryl Fraehlich & Jane Ursel, “Arresting Women: Pro-arrest Policies Debates and 
Developments” (2014) 29 J Family Violence 507; Julie Poon, Myrna Dawson & Mavis Morton, “Factors 
Increasing the Likelihood of Dual and Sole Charging of Women for Intimate Partner Violence” (2012) 20:12 
Violence Against Women 1447; Pamela Cross, It Shouldn’t Be This Hard: A Gender-Based Analysis of Family 
Law, Family Court and Violence Against Women (Oshawa, ON: Luke’s Place Support & Resource Centre for 
Women & Children, 2012); Dragiewicz & DeKeseredy, supra note 21; Shoshana Pollack et al, Women Charged 
with Domestic Violence in Toronto: The Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Charge Policies (Toronto: 
Woman Abuse Council of Toronto, March 2005) online: <www.womanabuse.ca>. In the American context, see 
Melissa Dichter, “‘They Arrested Me – And I Was the Victim’: Women’s Experiences With Getting Arrested in 
the Context of Domestic Violence” (2013) 23:2 Women & Criminal Justice 81; Alesha Durfee, “Situational 
Ambiguity and Gendered Patterns of Arrest for Intimate Partner Violence” (2012) 18:1 Violence Against 
Women 64; Susan L Miller & Michelle L Meloy, “Women’s Use of Force: Voices of Women Arrested for 
Domestic Violence” (2006) 12:1 Violence Against Women 89. 
24  Neilson registers a concern where women’s allegations are treated with skepticism, as motivated by malice, and 
as designed to alienate a child’s father. Neilson, supra note 16. See also Holly Johnson & Jennifer 
Fraser, Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Do They Make Women Safer? Community Report: Phase I 
(Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2011) online: Ontario Association of Interval and Transition Houses 
<www.oaith.ca/assets/files/Publications/Criminal%20Law/DVC-Do-theyMake-Women-Safer.pdf>.  
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little they mattered.”25 This marginal role within the justice system, she observes, was a 
“humiliation only too reminiscent of the original crime.”26 In a moving personal account of her 
own experiences as a Black middle-class woman abused by a White working-class man, 
Stephanie Sweetnam writes this of her experience of Canada’s legal system:  
 
I was subjected to the racist and sexist nature of our flawed legal system. I came to 
believe, and remain convinced, that the legal system is a form of violence in itself 
that abuses society’s most vulnerable and oppressed populations. Had I not been as 
strong-willed and educated, I would have given up a long time ago and succumbed to 
prevailing ideas associated with abused women, and women of color. One wonders 
about the women who are not as privileged as me. How do they cope with a biased 
and inconsistent legal system, and a society that perpetuates hegemonic masculinity, 
excuses violence against women, and blames the victim rather than the perpetrator of 
abuse? … Simply put, redemption must be found within oneself because the legal 
system does not venture to ensure “justice for all.”27 
 
B. The Strategic Use of Legal Processes and Systems by Coercive Controllers  
 In the words of Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, “[u]nfortunately, many Canadian men and 
women find themselves unable, mainly for financial reasons, to access the Canadian justice 
system.”28 The image here, which is a common one, is of men and women who desire access but 
who encounter a host of often insurmountable barriers. Yet for many women who experience 
abuse in their intimate relationship, the access to justice problem is often of an entirely different 
sort. They are not seeking entry to the justice system but, rather, are unwillingly drawn in by 
their abusive partners (and, in some instances, by the state), despite their best efforts to avoid it.  
 Extensive research documents that a common tactic among coercive controllers is, as noted in 
the introduction, the use of threats (sometimes acted upon) to invoke various legal systems: to 
report a woman to child welfare authorities for abusing or neglecting her children; to initiate 
family law proceedings seeking sole or joint custody; to call the police to report her as having 
abused him; to report her for welfare fraud if she or they are in receipt of social assistance; and to 
engage immigration processes to facilitate her deportation if she  is not a Canadian citizen.29 In 
many instances, once one of these legal systems is engaged, others are notified, and, as detailed 
more fully in the third part of this article, women are then subject to surveillance by various state 
actors with the power to apprehend their children, terminate social assistance benefits, pursue 
criminal charges, and remove them from the country. Significantly, the coercive controller turns 
                                                            
25  Judith Lewis Herman, “Justice From the Victim’s Perspective” (2005) 11:5 Violence Against Women 571 at 
581. 
26  Ibid at 682. 
27  Sweetnam, supra note 6 at 136.  
28  McLachlin, supra note 1. 
29  Andrea Vollum, Court-Related Abuse and Harassment: Leaving an abuser can be harder than staying 
(Vancouver: Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), 2010), online: YWCA Metro Vancouver 
<www.ywcavan.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Litigation%20Abuse%20FINAL.pdf>. See 
discussion later in this article; Neilson, supra note 16 at 28; Herman, supra note 25 at 575. 
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to these legal systems, not to resolve disputes or to enforce rights, but, rather, to maintain 
control, to punish, and to harm his partner. Here, we can see that the failure to fully appreciate 
coercive control impedes our ability to adequately differentiate sincere attempts to access justice 
from the use of legal systems to enlarge an abusive partner’s power and control. 
 In legal proceedings to which the coercive controller is a party, research – particularly in the 
family law context – documents a range of ways in which he uses litigation to continue to abuse, 
intimate, control, and harass.30 Variously referred to as procedural abuses, legal bullying, paper 
stalking, paper abuse, and post-separation violence, his repertoire includes self-representing by 
choice in order to cross-examine his former partner, bringing multiple and frequent motions, 
dragging out support and custody proceedings in order to maintain control over his partner or 
sometimes solely for the purpose of depleting her financial resources so that, if represented, she 
will no longer be able to afford counsel, refusing to pay support, and withholding assets.31 As the 
women in Herman’s study noted, the “strategies of domination and control” to which they had 
been subjected by the perpetrators of violence against them “seemed well suited to the legal 
system.”32 
 Susan Miller and Nicole Smolter’s description of how civil protection orders (intended to 
protect women)33 have become “tools in the abuser’s arsenal calculated to wear them down, 
whittle away their self-esteem, and create hardships as they work to negotiate their lives absent 
of men’s violence, power, and control” could apply equally to a range of legal processes.34 The 
analogy they draw to stalking is a compelling one, and, as they point out, the confounding 
difference here is that the stalker is exercising legal options rather than performing criminal acts 
against a former intimate partner. Indeed, his conduct is often overlooked or justified as a 
legitimate attempt to exercise his legal rights – to access justice – rather than the continuation of 
coercive control. Sociologist Jane Gordon writes this of her own experience: 
 
The psychological effect of this took its toll; the whole experience was devastating. 
Requests for appropriate restraints within the legal system were denied. I felt that 
                                                            
30  Martinson, supra note 7 at 6; see also Federal-Provincial-Territorial Ad Hoc Working Group on Family 
Violence, Making the Links in Family Violence Cases: Collaboration among the Family, Child Protection and 
Criminal Justice Systems, vol 1 (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2013) at 91 [Working Group]. 
31  See Susan L Miller & Nicole L Smolter, “‘Paper Abuse’: When All Else Fails, Batterers Use Procedural 
Stalking” (2011) 17:5 Violence Against Women 637; Vollum, supra note 29; Cross, supra note 23 at 35, 37, 57, 
63, 71; Neilson, supra note 16 at 28, 31.  
32  Herman, supra note 25, recounts that many women in her study provided examples of when they believed the 
perpetrator had successfully manipulated the system. Herman notes that by comparison to the criminal context, 
women in the civil context felt they had more control yet, at the same time, experienced feeling “powerless and 
marginalized in face of complex rules and procedures of the legal system, which they often perceived as a 
cynical game” (at 584). 
33  Civil protection orders exist in most of Canada’s provinces and territories. In Ontario, legislation creating civil 
protection orders, the Domestic Violence Protection Act, was passed in 2000 but never proclaimed. In 2009, this 
legislation was repealed when reforms to the Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C12, s 39 [CLRA], 
which included new restraining order provisions (the breach of which now constitutes a criminal offence), were 
introduced. 
34  Miller & Smolter, supra note 31 at 640. 
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there was no protection anywhere in the system for my interests or for those of my 
children; instead, judges informed me again and again that they would not interfere 
with my former husband’s access to the judicial system.35 
 
Kathryn Wellman describes one of the “unintended consequences” of a number of feminist 
reforms in the area of domestic violence – civil domestic violence legislation, a more rigorous 
criminal justice response, and expanded child welfare mandates to include children witnessing 
domestic violence – has been the expansion of “the opportunity [for batterers] to use the legal 
system as an additional avenue to harass their victims. Batterers can now file their own civil 
protection orders, fight for custody of their children, and, once in the legal system, attempt to re-
victimize battered women by repeatedly dragging them into court.”36 
 While the doctrine of abuse of process recognizes inherent powers in the courts to control 
their processes to prevent abuse – be it through collateral attacks, the attempt to re-litigate 
matters already decided, frivolous actions, or vexatious litigation – relatively little attention has 
been given to the use of legal processes to further the abuse of women. The doctrine does 
recognize the use of legal processes to harass or oppress as a form of abuse, and case law 
indicating that one need consider the “whole history” of the matter might be usefully extended – 
it is not only the whole history of the litigation that needs to be considered but, rather, the history 
of coercive control.37 Bringing a nuanced, contextualized understanding of coercive control to 
the abuse-of-process doctrine would help differentiate men’s genuine efforts to access justice and 
their strategic manipulation of legal processes to control and punish their former partners.  
 
C. Navigating Intersecting Legal Systems  
 As noted above, multiple legal systems will frequently be engaged, simultaneously and/or 
sequentially. The existence of domestic violence will be relevant to a range of legal and 
administrative determinations: whether a child is in need of protection; whether the accused is 
guilty of a criminal offence; to whom custody should be awarded and access granted; whether 
welfare authorities will exempt a woman from the obligation to pursue child support (including 
through legal proceedings); and whether immigration authorities will revoke a woman’s 
conditional permanent resident status, grant permanent resident status on a humanitarian and 
compassionate basis, or find her claim to be a refugee well founded.38 Recognition of the 
relevance of domestic violence to many of these legal issues has been quite recent, and more 
                                                            
35  Jane Gordon “Multiple Meanings of Equality: A Case Study in Custody Litigation” (1989) 3 CJWL 256 at 263. 
36  Kathryn Gillespie Wellman, “Taking the Next Step in the Legal Response to Domestic Violence: The Need to 
Reexamine Specialized Domestic Violence Courts from a Victim Perspective” (2013) 24:3 Colum J Gender & 
L 444 at 453. Wellman’s argument is focused in particular on specialized domestic violence courts, but, more 
broadly, she examines the history of legal responses to domestic violence and a host of unanticipated 
consequences of reform efforts. 
37  Dale Streiman & Kurz LLP v De Teresi, 2007 CanLii 1902 (ONSC), citing Henry J in Lang Michener v Fabian 
1987 CanLII 172 (ONSC). 
38  See Jennifer Koshan, “Investigating Integrated Domestic Violence Courts: Lessons from New York” (2014) 
51:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 989 at 1007–1009, observing that many problems arise as a result of need to navigate 
multiple forums to address all of these issues. 
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recent still has been the attention to the particular problems created by multiple system 
engagement. The literature that does exist focuses primarily on the interactions of criminal and 
family law (and, in particular, on evaluations of integrated domestic violence courts),39 
occasionally drawing in child welfare, as does the recent 2013 report of the Federal-Provincial-
Territorial Ad Hoc Working Group on Family Violence [Working Group].40  
 To my knowledge, there is no Canadian data that captures the full extent of multiple legal 
systems engagement, and, indeed, even the data on parallel legal proceedings are limited. The 
Working Group provides a helpful overview of some of the existing studies: a file review of 
Toronto family law court files revealed that in 10.7 percent of such files there was also a criminal 
proceeding in relation to domestic violence; 38 percent of family law lawyers surveyed in 2010 
reported that in their cases involving family violence their clients were often or always also 
before the criminal courts; and a survey of child welfare cases in which domestic violence was 
the grounds for investigation revealed a considerable overlap with criminal proceedings (36 
percent) and, of these cases, also with a child custody dispute (28 percent).41 In Molly 
Dragiewicz and Walter DeKeseredy’s review of family courts in eight regions in Ontario, 
approximately 80 percent of the women they interviewed who were involved in family law 
proceedings had had contact with the police. Of these, 45 percent reported that criminal charges 
had been laid. In their interviews with community advocates, many reported that their clients 
were dealing with concurrent family and criminal law proceedings and that a very significant 
percentage was also dealing with child protection services.42 Front-line service providers have 
also recently noted that it is becoming increasingly common for women to be interacting with 
more than one legal system, including engagement with parallel family and immigration 
proceedings. Consequently, those working in the sector are seeing women with increasingly 
complex legal problems.43 Beyond the instances in which multiple proceedings are commenced 
are a host of other system interactions that may occur in relation to investigations, administration 
decision making, and alternative dispute resolution processes.  
                                                            
39  See Koshan, supra note 38, for an extensive review of this literature. See also Margaret B Drew & Marilu E 
Gresens, “Denying Choice of Forum: An Interference by the Massachusetts Trial Court with Domestic Violence 
Victims’ Rights and Safety” (2010) 43:2 Suffolk UL Rev 293; Robyn Mazur & Liberty Aldrich, “What Makes a 
Domestic Violence Court Work? Lessons from New York” (2003) 42:2 Judges’ J 5. 
40  Working Group, supra note 30. The Working Group makes clear that immigration proceedings, non-family 
civil, and the division of matrimonial property are beyond the scope of its work, as are “non-justice sector 
responses” (at 15). 
41  Ibid at 26–27. 
42  Dragiewicz & DeKeresedy, supra note 21 at 23, 43–44. 
43  See Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic, Justice Done: Crafting Opportunity from Adversity (Toronto: 
Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic, 2011); Joan Riggs, The Impacts of Recent Law Reforms on Abused 
Women Involved in The Family Court Process in Ontario: An Environmental Scan of Violence Against Women 
Service Providers (Oshawa, ON: Luke’s Place Support and Resource Centre for Women and Children, 12 
October 2011), online: Luke’s Place <www.lukesplace.ca/pdf/Impacts_LP_Final_Report.pdf>. The latter report 
concludes that “[i]mmigration law and its impact on women as they go through the family law system are 
currently the least understood and addressed in the system” (at 7). Websites offering information and advice to 
women advise of the increasingly complex inter-relationship of family law and immigration law and counsel 
women to get legal representation.  
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 These various systems differ in many fundamental respects. They have varied, and in some 
instances conflicting, mandates; they differ in the “verification” required to establish domestic 
violence and, indeed, in their conceptualizations of that violence (variously framed as abuse, 
family violence, and intimate partner violence); and should legal proceedings be invoked, they 
differ in party structure, the rules of evidence, the burden of proof, and the length of time to 
come to a decision.44 To illustrate – but by no means to exhaustively review the complex and 
often fraught nature of these system interactions – a case study may assist.45 Assume a woman 
enters Canada on a visitor’s permit to spend time with her boyfriend. While in Canada, they 
decide to marry. He promises to initiate a family class sponsorship. A year later, a child is born. 
While prior to the birth, her husband was verbally abusive and intensely regulated her dress, her 
contact with friends and family, and her spending, after the birth he becomes physically and 
sexually abusive. He repeatedly tells her that he has filed the papers to initiate a family class 
sponsorship so that she will gain permanent resident status, yet he regularly threatens to 
withdraw his sponsorship and that she will be deported if she does not comply with his demands. 
 His use of threats and promises regarding family class sponsorship – in reality, his control 
over her immigration status – reflects a practice repeatedly documented in the research.46 The 
West Coast Legal Education and Action Fund’s [LEAF] position paper on violence against 
women without immigration status captures this vividly: “[A]busive sponsors prey upon the 
precarious immigration status of their partners to control their behaviour and stop them from 
reporting the violence or leaving the relationship.”47 Should the woman in this hypothetical 
                                                            
44  Working Group, supra note 30 at 5, 14. 
45  While this “case study” is a hypothetical, it closely tracks the experiences of many of the mothers without status 
interviewed by the Vancouver YWCA. See Sheryl Burns, Single Mothers without Legal Status in Canada: 
Caught in the Intersection Between Immigration Law and Family Law (Vancouver: YWCA, March 2010), 
online: YWCA Metro Vancouver <www.ywcavan.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/YWCA-
%20Mothers%20Without%20Legal%20Status%20Report_2010_web.pdf>. A total of twenty-three mothers and 
thirty front-line workers and lawyers were interviewed for the project. The author notes that women’s fear about 
speaking extended to participation in the project, with women understandably uncertain as to whether the 
interviewer could be trusted or might make a report to Citizenship and Immigration Canada or to child 
protection services. The report includes incidents where, for example, a woman seeking emergency hospital 
services was reported to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). See also Rupaleem Bhuyan et al, 
Unprotected, Unrecognized: Canadian Immigration Policy and Violence Against Women, 2008–2013 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto, 14 November 2014), online: Migrant Mother’s Project <www.migrantmothers-
project.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/MMP-Policy-Report-Final-Nov-14-2014.pdf>. 
46  See eg Andrée Côté, Michèle Kérisit & Marie-Louise Côté, Sponsorship – For Better or For Worse: The Impact 
of Sponsorship on the Equality Rights of Immigrant Women (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, March 2001), 
online: CERIUM <www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/SW21-54-2000E.pdf>; Safety of Immigrant, Refugee and Non-
Status Women online: Ending Violence Association British Columbia 
 <www.endingviolence.org/files/uploads/IWP_Resource_Guide_FINAL.pdf> [EVA BC]; Janet Mosher, “The 
Complicity of the State in the Intimate Abuse of Immigrant Women” in Vijay Agnew, ed, Racialized Migrant 
Women in Canada: Essays on Health, Violence and Equity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 41. 
47  West Coast Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), “Position Paper on Violence against Women without 
Immigration Status” (May 2012), online: West Coast Leaf <www.westcoastleaf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/2012-POSITION-STATEMENT-Women-without-Status-in-Canada.pdf> at 2. The 
Migrant Mothers Project based in Ontario characterizes immigration status as a “pivotal factor that increases 
vulnerability to abuse and neglect.” Bhuyan et al, supra note 45. 
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situation decide to leave the relationship and apply for social assistance in Ontario, assuming the 
application for family class sponsorship has indeed been filed (her immigration status will be 
confirmed by contacting the CIC), she will be eligible to receive benefits.48 Unless she discloses 
the violence (and there is considerable evidence that abused women are very reluctant to disclose 
violence to front-line welfare workers),49 both the CIC and Ontario Works will contact her 
husband to seek enforcement of his financial sponsorship. And absent a disclosure and 
verification of violence, she will be required to make reasonable efforts to enforce the 
sponsorship agreement and may well be required to pursue a child support application in family 
court.50 Her entry into the immigration and family law systems, and potentially into legal 
proceedings, is not her choice; she is drawn in unwillingly and at best reluctantly. This is not an 
experience of access to justice. 
 In the event that her husband decides to revoke his sponsorship (and, not uncommonly, the act 
of leaving is what prompts this action) and she has no other form of application for status 
pending, she will be denied social assistance benefits. And because an application for benefits 
will result in contact with the CIC, it may well be what triggers immigration removal 
proceedings (and possibly immigration detention). She will also not have a work permit. She will 
be without status in Canada. Supporting herself and her child will be extraordinarily difficult. 
The worry that her child may be removed from her care by child welfare authorities (or custody 
awarded to her husband) if she is unable to provide the necessities of life and that she may be 
deported will be constant.51  
                                                            
48  Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, Ontario Works Policy Directive 3.11 Sponsored 
Immigrants (February 2013); Ontario Works will verify her status with CIC and will also verify whether there 
exists a valid undertaking and sponsorship. In circumstances of the sponsorship of a family class member who 
is a spouse, the length of the financial undertaking to provide for the essential needs of the sponsored person is 
three years. In British Columbia, amendments introduced in 2012 render a parent with a dependent Canadian 
citizen child and who has separated from an abusive spouse, has applied for permanent resident status, and who 
cannot leave British Columbia with the child due to a court order, agreement, or ongoing claim to custody or 
access by a person resident in BC, eligible for assistance. See BC Reg198/2012.  
49  Taryn Lindhorst, Marcia Meyers & Erin Casey, “Screening for Domestic Violence in Public Welfare Offices: 
An Analysis of Case Manager and Client Interactions” (2008) 14:1 Violence Against Women 5. 
50  Policy Directive 3.11, supra note 48. CIC will send a warning letter to the sponsor and Ontario Works will also 
contact the sponsor in relation to recovery of the sponsorship debt, unless an allegation of “abuse and/or family 
violence” (undefined in the directive) is made. In these circumstances, Ontario Works requests that CIC not 
send a warning letter. While in the ordinary course, a woman will be required to make reasonable efforts to 
secure the financial support under the sponsorship agreement, this can be temporarily waived for three to twelve 
months if “there is a breakdown in the sponsorship relationship because of abuse and/or family violence.” The 
circumstances warranting a waiver must be clearly documented, and reasonable third party verification from 
“police, a lawyer, a community or health care professional” provided. The obligation to pursue financial support 
can be permanently waived if there is “evidence of abuse or family violence over a prolonged period of time 
and the Administrator is satisfied that it is not in the best interest of the sponsored immigrant to pursue support.” 
Similar provisions apply in relation to the obligation to pursue child and spousal support. See Ontario Ministry 
of Community and Social Services, Ontario Works Policy Directive 5.5 Family Support (February 2013). A 
waiver is also possible here if “evidence of domestic violence or a restraining order is in effect against the other 
parent” is provided.  
51  Burns, supra note 45; Dragiewicz & DeKeseredy, supra note 21 at 51. 
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 Without his family class sponsorship, her only option to regularize her status in most 
instances is to initiate a “humanitarian and compassionate” (H & C) application. The H & C 
application often takes two years (if not more) to process. It involves the exercise of ministerial 
discretion to decide whether to permit the application to be made from within Canada and 
whether to grant permanent resident status.52 Governed by an internal policy guide (IP5), officers 
are to consider a range of factors, among them, evidence of her “establishment” in Canada (often 
difficult for an abused woman who has been socially isolated and unable to secure employment), 
her ties to Canada, “family violence considerations” (officers are directed to consider “police 
incident reports, charges or convictions, reports from shelters for abused women, medical 
reports, etc.”53), the best interests of any children affected by the application (officers are clearly 
instructed that this “does not mean that the best interest of the child outweighs all other 
factors”),54 and the consequences of the separation of relatives.55 Moreover, at the end of the day, 
after all other processing has concluded, her application is likely to be unsuccessful if she 
continues to be in receipt of social assistance.56  
 The H & C application also does not prevent her removal from the country, and, in some 
circumstances, she will be removed without her child. A family law order will have an important 
bearing here. If there exists an order for joint custody or for access in favour of the child’s father, 
she cannot leave the country with her child. However, particularly if the order was made prior to 
the commencement of removal proceedings, it may serve to delay her removal. The courts have 
also been clear that non-removal orders under child custody legislation cannot be granted for the 
purposes of frustrating removal orders in immigration proceedings.57 Similarly, in the family law 
realm, the woman’s “lack of status may disadvantage her during a child custody hearing if her 
former spouse suggests she has the capacity to abduct their children.”58 Notwithstanding these 
important system interactions, she cannot count on accessing decision makers who will fully 
understand and consider these interactions. In the worst case scenario, she will be removed 
without her child prior to the determination of her H & C application, her application will 
ultimately be unsuccessful, and the child will remain in the sole custody of the abusive father (or, 
                                                            
52  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 25 [IRPA]. 
53  CIC, IP5 Immigrant Applications in Canada made on Humanitarian or Compassionate Grounds (Ottawa: CIC, 
2011) at 50. 
54  Ibid at 14 (emphasis in original). 
55  Ibid at 13. 
56  Ibid at 61. See Heather Neufeld, “Inadequacies of the Humanitarian and Compassionate Procedure for Abused 
Immigrant Spouses” (2009) 22 JL & Soc Pol’y 177; Mosher, supra note 46; Nicole Simes, “The Impact of 
Spousal Sponsorship Laws on Intimate Partner Violence: A Canadian-American Comparison” (2010) 7:1 JL & 
Equality 91. 
57  See eg JH v FA, 2009 ONCA 17. See also NEC v AAA, 2010 ONCJ 54, wherein the court fashioned an order for 
custody and access that was very much alive to the unfolding deportation proceedings against the mother. 
58  West Coast LEAF, supra note 47 at 3. Martinson, supra note 7 at 8, drawing upon her experience in working to 
facilitate judicial communication in child abduction cases, notes that “both in Canada and world-wide, most of 
the parents who take children without the legal authority to do so (1) are women who have moved from their 
homes to another place, met someone, have children; (2) say that they and their children are experiencing IPV; 
(3) feel they are unsafe; (4) don’t think they will be protected in the place they are living; and (5) take the 
children and go back home.”  
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potentially, the child welfare authorities).59 While both the immigration and family law systems 
do consider the “best interests of the child” – this being the determinative factor in family law –it 
is only one of a number of factors considered in relation to an H & C application. 
 Invoking the criminal justice system through a call to police adds yet another layer of 
complexity. As noted earlier, a call to police will prompt contact with child protection authorities 
and very likely with immigration.60 There is a risk that her spouse will blame her and that she 
may be charged.61 The charge alone, and almost certainly a conviction, will impact her 
immigration status. Indeed, changes to the Immigration and Refugee Reform Act in relation to 
“criminality” and “serious criminality” have rendered this more likely.62 Should she be charged, 
and a routine no-contact order issued as a condition of her release, this may establish a status quo 
in relation to custody that will bear heavily on the outcome of any contested custody matter. The 
terms of a bail order may also preclude participation in any counselling mandated by the child 
protection authorities.63  
 While an endless array of possible cross-system impacts exists, particularly concerning is the 
rippling effect of engagement (or lack thereof) with the criminal justice system. A conviction 
will often constitute the “proof” or “verification” required as women navigate other systems. In 
the context of family law proceedings, the conviction will be treated as prima facie evidence of 
the underlying conduct, and while not determinative of the outcome regarding custody and 
access, it will play an important role. A conviction will also be important in providing the 
verification of abuse required, as noted above, in an H & C application and for a waiver of her 
obligation to pursue child support or an immigration undertaking, if she is in receipt of social 
assistance.64 While neither regime restricts acceptable verification to a conviction, a conviction is 
often treated as the gold standard. An acquittal (or, indeed, the absence of a criminal proceeding) 
                                                            
59  Colleen Varcoe & Lori Irwin, “‘If I Killed You, I’d Get the Kids:’ Women’s Survival and Protection Work with 
Child Custody and Access in the Context of Woman Abuse” (2004) 27:1 Qualitative Sociology 77. 
60  Burns, supra note 45. Women in the YWCA study reported not calling the police for fear of not being believed 
and of being deported. In instances where police had been called and a charged laid, abusers threatened to 
cancel sponsorships unless women recanted. Throughout North America, the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell movement 
has sought to facilitate the ability of those with precarious status to access critical social services – including 
policing – without risk of immigration and border control involvement. Toronto City Council voted on 21 
February 2013 to become a “sanctuary city” wherein access would be assured. The position of the Toronto 
Police Services is that “victims and witnesses of crime shall not be asked their immigration status, unless there 
are bona fide reasons to do so,” however if status is disclosed, this must be reported to CIC. Toronto Police 
Services, “Victims and Witnesses without Legal Status” online: Toronto Police Service 
<www.torontopolice.on.ca/publications/files/victims_and_witnesses_wthout_legal_status.pdf>. See also 
Abigail Deshman, “To Serve Some and Protect Fewer: The Toronto Police Services’ Policy on Non-Status 
Victims and Witnesses of Crime,” (2009) 22 JL & Soc Pol’y 20. 
61  Pollack et al, supra note 23. 
62  IRPA, supra note 52, s 36(1)–(2). Most troubling is the combined effect of sections 36(2) and 36(3)(a); the latter 
deems all hybrid offences to be indictable offences and the former provides that a foreign national is 
inadmissible if convicted in Canada of an offence punishable by way of indictment. Common assault (section 
266 of the Criminal Code) is a hybrid offence and, as a result, even a conviction for common assault will render 
a foreign national inadmissible to Canada.  
63  Working Group, supra note 30 at 58. 
64  See the discussion of waivers and verification in note 50 in this article.  
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will not be determinative of the outcome in other contexts, but it is also likely to be highly 
impactful.  
 The heavy reliance often placed on the outcome in the criminal justice system is especially 
troubling in light of the reality that for a host of reasons – contact with child welfare authorities, 
fear of retaliation, loss of income support and potentially of housing, shame, love, fear of a racist 
response, community ties, distrust, and immigration consequences – most women never report 
the abuse to police.65 As such, a concern arises regarding the weight that actors situated within 
multiple legal domains place on the criminal justice system to provide verification and proof of 
the violence.66 As Linda Neilson concludes, “[i]f family lawyers and courts ignore or discount 
patterns and incidents of domestic violence that do not result in a criminal charge, the vast 
majority of the criminal acts of domestic violence will not be considered in family and child 
protection litigation.”67 Moreover, the focus on the criminal charge and conviction reinforces the 
incident-based approach to domestic violence, obscuring the tactics deployed by coercive 
controllers, including their use of law and legal processes, to isolate, entrap, and control women. 
As Veronica Thronson illustrates by reference to threats to revoke immigration sponsorships, it is 
not merely a matter of family court judges understanding immigration relief but also 
understanding “how abusers can use the immigration status of their partners and their partner’s 
children to control and prolong abusive relationships ... Family courts must be aware that abusers 
may use the courts to continue to perpetuate abuse on their partners and must prevent 
exploitation of family proceedings to perpetuate abuse.”68  
 Another possibility is that the woman in this hypothetical may be faced with conflicting legal 
orders. In its 2013 report, the Working Group observed that it is “not uncommon in many parts 
of Canada for a criminal court to issue a peace bond or make an order with respect to bail or 
sentencing, without knowledge that there are simultaneous family law proceedings between the 
parties, or that a family law order has already been issued.”69 Similarly, family court judges may 
order a settlement conference or make an access ruling that conflicts with pre-existing bail or 
probation conditions precluding the accused’s contact with his intimate partner and children. As 
the Honourable Donna Martinson explains, “criminal courts order no contact, child protection 
authorities say the children will be apprehended if there is contact and the family court focuses 
on the view that contact is in the best interests of the child and grants unsupervised access.”70 
                                                            
65  Statistics Canada, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile, Catalogue no 85-224-X (Ottawa: Statistics 
Canada, 2011) at 5, reporting on data from the General Social Survey where in 2009, 22 percent of victims of 
spousal violence stated that the incident came to the attention of the police. Working Group, supra note 30 at 
59; Johnson & Fraser, supra note 24; Aya Gruber, “The Feminist War on Crime” (2007) 92 Iowa L Rev 741; 
Dianne Martin & Janet Mosher, “Unkept Promises: Experiences of Immigrant Women with the Neo-
Criminalization of Wife Abuse” (1995) 8 CJWL 3. 
66  Neilson, supra note 16 at 13–16; Working Group, supra note 30 at 30–33. 
67  Neilson, supra note 16 at 15. 
68  Veronica T Thronson, “Domestic Violence and Immigrants in Family Courts” (2012) 63:1 Juvenile & Family 
Crt J 63 at 74. 
69  Working Group, supra note 30 at 12.  
70  Martinson, supra note 7 (slide presentation), online: University of New Brunswick 
<www.unb.ca/conferences/mmfc2014/_resources/presentations/donna-martinson-keynote-slides.pdf>.  
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 A background report for the Working Group prepared by criminal defence lawyers notes that 
having access to information about family law and child welfare proceedings at the bail hearing 
– where no contact orders are routinely issued – is vital, yet very difficult, to obtain, especially 
given that the bail hearing occurs quickly.71 Indeed, the Working Group concludes that 
“[c]urrently in Canada, there is no jurisdiction with the technological capacity to implement 
systemic matching on an ongoing basis.”72 The challenge of accessing this information directly 
from the parties is heightened when parties are self-represented, as is commonly the case.73 In 
the event of conflicting orders, while the criminal court order will technically trump that issued 
by the family court, the result for families without explicit legal advice is likely to be confusion, 
and for women and children, potentially compromised safety.74  
 In other circumstances, orders may not conflict, but they will be inconsistent. As Justice 
Harvey Brownstone explains, it is possible for a family court judge to make a factual 
determination that violence did not exist, yet for a criminal conviction to be subsequently 
secured, notwithstanding the higher burden of proof in the latter case. As he explains, this could 
arise where a woman is unrepresented in family court (a very common occurrence) yet has 
expert legal counsel in the form of a Crown attorney able to adduce a solid evidentiary 
foundation to support a conviction in the criminal proceeding.75 While the result is not the 
existence of conflicting orders, the inconsistent factual determinations and the conviction in the 
criminal proceeding raise concerns regarding whether the custody and access arrangements 
ordered in the family law context adequately account for the risk of future harm. Equally 
concerning are inconsistent outcomes between family courts and immigration determinations: a 
family court may determine that the best interest of the child rests in an award of joint custody, 
but a mother without status is ordered removed from Canada. 
 A number of lawyers and judges understand these various legal systems to interact in yet 
another manner – that is, as strategically deployed by disingenuous victims. For example, in a 
background report for the Working Group, lawyers were advised to take the time to explain to 
their clients the consequences of invoking the criminal justice system since it may “give a client 
pause where he or she is contemplating making a complaint to police out of frustration rather 
                                                            
71  Joseph Di Luca, Erin Dann & Breese Davies, Best Practices where there is Family Violence (Criminal Law 
Perspective) (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2012). 
72  Working Group, supra note at 30 at 76. Recent changes in Ontario may go a small distance in addressing this. 
Reforms to the CLRA, supra note 33, require a parenting affidavit be filed in support of an application for 
custody. Required elements of the affidavit include information regarding involvement in a child protection 
court case, criminal convictions, current charges, and any criminal offences. In addition, the deponent is asked, 
in relation to section 24(4) of the Act which requires the court to consider whether the person has at any time 
committed violence or abuse against a spouse, child or member of the housing, to “describe incident(s) or 
episode(s) and provide information about the nature of the violence or abuse, who committed the violence and 
who the victim(s) was/were.” See Family Law Rules, O Reg 114/99, Form 35.1: Affidavit in Support of Claim 
for Custody or Access.  
73  Working Group, supra note 30 at 75.  
74  Ibid at 64. The relationship between child welfare and family law orders is addressed in Child and Family 
Services Act, RSO 1990, c C.11, ss 57, 57.1, 57.2 [CFSA]. 
75  Working Group, supra note 30 at 110, citing Harvey Brownstone, Tug of War: A Judge’s Verdict on 
Separation, Custody Battles, and the Bitter Realities of Family Court (Toronto: ECW Press, 2009). 
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than fear or for the purpose of gaining an advantage in the family law proceedings.”76 And while 
noting concerns for women’s safety, the report’s authors suggest that “[b]alanced against these 
concerns, however, must be a recognition that in the often emotional context of a family 
breakdown, allegations of violence made by one spouse against another can be exaggerated or 
even fabricated.”77  
 A counter-argument draws our attention to the empirical literature showing that the much 
more common situation is for no evidence at all to be adduced in relation to the abuse in the 
relationship or for that evidence, if presented, to be discounted.78 This may occur because a 
woman has not disclosed the abuse – it is not only the police to whom women are reluctant to 
disclose – and, if represented, because her counsel has not screened for abuse. The Working 
Group has reviewed evidence that suggests few lawyers screen for domestic violence: 83 percent 
of lawyers attending a national family law program in 2010 indicated that they never or rarely 
used a screening tool.79 In some instances, the abuse is disclosed but not adduced because of an 
assessment by counsel that the disclosure may be considered as evidence that her client is an 
“unfriendly parent” or that she is fabricating allegations as a ploy to secure custody.80 
Disturbingly, research undertaken by the Vancouver Young Women’s Christian Association 
[YWCA] found that even where a child has been directly abused lawyers and advocates often 
advise mothers without status “not to disclose such abuse [in family law proceedings] unless they 
can prove it through physical or third-party evidence because such allegations may be considered 
false and therefore harm the mother’s case for custody.”81 In addition, significant problems will 
arise, no doubt, when, as Martinson and others have observed, family law judges (or lawyers) 
                                                            
76  Di Luca, Dann & Davies, supra note 71 at 6.  
77  Ibid at 9. 
78  Neilson, supra note 16 at 13–14. Neilson underscores the point that the failure to present evidence of domestic 
violence occurs at all stages of the family law process and that this failing is repeatedly found in empirical 
studies. This occurs, Neilson and others maintain, for a variety of reasons: settlement pressure (including from 
professionals); judicial resistance; and the lack of understanding among professionals. See also Elizabeth L 
MacDowell, “When Courts Collide: Integrated DV Courts and Court Pluralism” (2010–2011) 20 Texas J 
Women & L 95 at 114, who points out that many domestic violence cases are never identified by courts as 
domestic violence cases, even when the violence is relevant to the issues before the court. 
79  Working Group, supra note 30 at 130. Recent legislative changes in British Columbia require all family dispute 
resolution professionals to screen for family violence to assess whether dispute resolution processes are safe and 
appropriate. See Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25. An early assessment suggests, however, that there has not 
been an appreciable increase in the information provided to judges, in either the family or criminal law settings, 
about family violence and the risk of future harm. As the authors conclude, “[t]hese results raise the potential 
that the aims of the FLA to ensure the safety, security and well-being of victims of family violence, and in 
particular children, are not, at least in the early days, being met. If this is true, this presents a significant justice 
concern.” See Donna Martinson & Margaret Jackson, “Risk of Future Harm: Family Violence and Information 
Sharing Between Family and Criminal Courts” (final report by the Canadian Observatory on the Justice 
System’s Response to Intimate Partner Violence, 14 January 2016) online: The FREDA Centre for Research on 
Violence Against Women <www.fredacentre.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Observatory-Martinson-
Jackson-Risk-Report-FINAL-January-14-2016.pdf> at 3. 
80  Christine Harrison, “Implacably Hostile or Appropriately Protective? Women Managing Child Contact in the 
Context of Domestic Violence” (2008) 14:4 Violence Against Women 381. 
81  Burns, supra note 45 at 23. 
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are, for example, unaware of the immigration consequences of their orders.82 The absence of 
screening, together with the views expressed regarding the strategic use of allegations of 
domestic violence, reveal something even more troubling than a narrow incident-based 
conceptualization of domestic violence: the lingering hold of myths regarding women’s 
fabrications of violence.83 Significantly, far less attention has been paid to the strategic 
engagement of the legal systems by coercive controllers.  
 Finally, as will be clear, the engagement with multiple legal systems often necessitates the 
retelling of one’s story and, no doubt, seemingly endless court appearances with attendant costs, 
delays, the expanded potential for contact with the abuser, and increased levels of stress.84 
Importantly, the Working Group has drawn attention to the conclusions of various death review 
committees and inquests that the failure to share information has impeded fully informed risk 
assessments and has been a contributing factor in tragic family homicides.85 Similarly, the lack 
of information sharing has been identified as undermining the assessment of risk to women and 
children in the context of various immigration and refugee determinations, including those facing 
a Canadian citizen child if the mother is to be removed.86  
 Not surprisingly, websites designed to provide information to women urge them to secure 
legal advice. The woman in my hypothetical, if searching for guidance on the Internet might 
learn that “[i]f you are dealing with family law issues get legal advice as soon as possible to 
protect your rights”87 and that “timely immigration legal advice is extremely important.”88 Yet 
women’s access to counsel is often extraordinarily limited, both because they rarely have the 
                                                            
82  Martinson, supra note 7 at 6. A similar observation is repeatedly made in the American literature; see eg David 
B Thronson, “Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: The Problematically Peripheral Role of Immigration Law in 
the Globalization of Family Law” (2013) 22 Transnational L & Contemporary Problems 655, noting that in 
their struggle with the complexities at the intersections of family law and criminal law some judges ignore 
immigration issues entirely, while others attach undue weight (at 656). For a state-by-state review, see Soraya 
Fata et al, “Custody of Children in Mixed-Status Families: Preventing the Misunderstanding and Misuse of 
Immigration Status in State-Court Custody Proceedings” (2013) 47:2 Fam LQ 230. 
83  See Cross, supra note 23 for a discussion of this issue, and Elaine Craig more generally on the enduring nature 
of these myths. Elaine Craig, “Examining the Websites of Canada’s ‘Top Sex Crime Lawyers’: The Ethical 
Parameters of Online Commercial Expression by the Criminal Defence Bar” (2015) 48:2 UBC L Rev 257. 
84  Koshan, supra note 38 at 1011; Working Group, supra note 30 at 85–87. 
85  Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, Honouring Christian Lee: No Private Matter: Protecting Children Living with 
Domestic Violence (Victoria: Office of the Representative for Children and Youth, September 2009), online: 
Representative for Children and Youth <www.rcybc.ca/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/reports_publi-
cations/honouring_christian_lee.pdf>; Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, Honouring Kaitlynne, Max and Cordon: 
Make Their Voices Heard Now (Victoria: Office of the Representative for Children and Youth, March 2012), 
online: Representative for Children and Youth <www.rcybc.ca/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/reports_publi-
cations/honouring_kaitlynne.pdf>. 
86  EVA BC, supra note 46 at 158–162. 
87  “Finding Help with your Family Law Problem,” online: Family Law Education for Women 
<www.onefamilylaw.ca/en/legalhelp>. 
88  Kristin Marshall, “Can a woman be deported without her child?,” online: Luke’s Place 
<lukesplace.ca/resources/can-a-woman-be-deported-without-her-child/>. 
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income to privately retain counsel and because legal aid plans provide limited or no coverage.89 
As the Vancouver YWCA report concludes, women are often left to deal with the immigration 
and family law systems entirely on their own.90 However, it is clear that a woman requires not 
simply access to a lawyer but also to one who understands these complex system interactions.91  
 The common response to these issues identified at the intersections of multiple legal systems 
is to urge greater collaboration, communication, and information sharing across systems. The 
Working Group concludes, for example, that “[e]nsuring adequate access to justice for families 
simultaneously navigating these various branches of the justice system requires a concerted 
effort on the part of justice system professionals and those working within these systems to 
provide a more cohesive and coordinated response to these important social issues,” and it 
reviews several promising practices in this regard.92 Martinson echoes this conclusion, adding 
that “meaningful access to justice in these cases requires using innovative approaches to such 
coordination that lead to not just consistent solutions, but the most effective solutions possible 
within the legal frameworks that apply.”93 Similarly, researchers and front-line advocates who 
have focused their attention on the intersections between immigration, family, and child welfare 
systems have called for increased coordination and information sharing.94 The Ending Violence 
                                                            
89  Among the many difficulties women report when self-representing are dealing with the paperwork, 
understanding court procedures, knowing how to act, ongoing abuse, and dealing with a former partner or his 
lawyer; see Dragiewicz & DeKeseredy, supra note 21 at 33. 
90  Burns, supra note 45 at; Law Commission of Ontario, supra note 1; Dragiewicz & DeKeseredy, supra note 21; 
Peter Jaffe, Claire Crooks & Nicolas Bala, “A Framework for Addressing Allegations of Domestic Violence in 
Child Custody Disputes” (2009) 6:3-4 Journal of Child Custody – Special Issue: Domestic Violence Issues in 
Child Custody 169; Pamela Cross, Through the Looking Glass: The Experiences of Unrepresented Abused 
Women in Family Court (Oshawa, ON: Luke’s Place Support and Resource Centre, March 2008), online: 
Ontario Association of Interval and Transitions Houses <www.oaith.ca/assets/files/Publications/Family%-
20Law/Through-the-looking-glass.pdf>. 
91  Cross, supra note 23. See R v Pham, 2013 SCC 15, where the court found that a sentencing judge may exercise 
a discretion to take into consideration the collateral consequences of a sentence – in this instance, that the 
imposition of a sentence of two years resulted in the accused losing the right to appeal a removal order against 
him. Neither party raised this at the time of sentencing. Indeed, it appears neither was aware of the 
consequences. The court reduced the sentence to two years less a day, remarking that it was wrong for the Court 
of Appeal to have refused to do so based on its belief that the accused had abused Canada’s hospitality. 
92  Working Group, supra note 30 at 17. The Working Group further describes access to justice as a “critical 
driver” of initiatives to improve system coordination and cohesion (at 14). While not addressing the specific 
interface of criminal, family, and child welfare proceedings, the Roadmap for Change report, supra note 1 at 7, 
comes to a similar conclusion. There is a need to “improve collaboration and coordination not only across and 
within jurisdictions, but also across and within all sectors and aspects of the justice system (civil, family, early 
dispute resolution, courts, tribunals, the Bar, the Bench, court administration, the academy, the public, etc.).” 
The British Columbia Justice Reform initiative, Making Justice Work, supra note 1 at 7, also emphasizes the 
need to break down silos in the justice system and to develop systems thinking. 
93  Martinson, supra note 7 at 1; see also Dragiewicz & DeKeseredy, supra note 21, who found overwhelming 
support among both women and community advocates in their study for increased communication between 
courts, automatic sharing of court orders, and the sharing of information related to risk assessment (at 24). 
94  See eg, EVA BC, Provincial Briefing Document 5: Executive Summary, Protection of Children of Abused 
Immigrant, Refugee and Non-Status Women (May 2010), online: Ending Violence Association of BC 
<www.endingviolence.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/BC_BN_5_Child_Protection.pdf>. 
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Association, a women’s advocacy organization in British Columbia, recommends a yet more 
expansive web of connectivity, drawing in not only criminal, family, child welfare, immigration, 
and social assistance systems but also settlement and other community-based agencies, health 
services, the education system, housing services, and the private bar.95  
 Greater system coordination and information sharing is held out as offering the potential for 
improved decision making, reductions in costs and delays, better coordination of services, 
stricter controls to limit procedural stalking and abuse, and the enhanced safety of women and 
children.96 While enhanced systems collaboration and coordination seems self-evidently sound, 
let me offer a few cautions – cautions that suggest we need to define more precisely to what ends 
collaboration, coordination, and information sharing are directed – and a call to consider 
women’s safety as an integral component of access to justice.97 
 Consider, for example, the possibility that particular kinds of court fragmentation may be in 
women’s interests – for example, that separate criminal and family law courts may be preferable 
to the integrated court model where one judge hears family and criminal law matters, separately, 
which is a model that is often proposed as a partial solution.98 While integrated courts may 
prevent conflicting orders and enhance judicial efficiency, they may create a new problem for 
women. Elizabeth McDowell calls this the “all your eggs in one basket” problem that results 
because “assignment to a single judicial officer only helps the limited number of victims with 
multiple cases whose first case proceeds favorably and where the hearing officer is provided with 
complete information.”99 One can imagine that, especially where the first case is framed 
narrowly, focused on a single incident of physical abuse, and where important evidence is 
missing, concerns might arise regarding the same judicial officer hearing the second or third 
cases (which are likely to involve child welfare and family law). A related point, which is also 
highlighted by McDowell, questions whether the proliferation of specialized domestic violence 
courts may operate to render domestic violence even less visible to legal actors working in 
domains outside of these courts, especially when the necessary expertise is concentrated among a 
few system actors rather than being broadly dispersed.100  
 The current rules governing information exchange between these legal systems and between 
various legal proceedings is enormously complex (and it is unfathomable how parties can self-
represent in any of these proceedings). This complexity, reviewed in considerable detail by the 
Working Group, arises because of the range of competing interests and values at stake: the 
                                                            
95  EVA BC, supra note 46 at 221. 
96  See also Wellman, supra note 36, who argues that fully integrated courts may mitigate the manipulation of the 
legal system by coercive controllers to inflict re-victimization; Koshan, supra note 38. The Working Group, 
supra note 30 at 91, concludes that a “lack of consistency can also encourage a proliferation of motions as 
litigants have little to lose making the same arguments before a different judge with the hope of getting a 
different result. Further, without a judge monitoring the overall number of applications, their frequency, or 
necessity, vexatious litigation can result in perpetrators using the legal system to continue abuse of the victim.” 
97  Wellman, supra note 36. 
98  An integrated court was established in Toronto in June 2011. A number have existed in the United States for 
quite some time; see Koshan, supra note 38 for a review of the literature evaluating these courts. 
99  MacDowell, supra note 78 at 112. 
100  Ibid at 114–115. 
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accuracy of decision making; fair trial rights; the fostering of beneficial therapeutic relationships; 
the protection of confidentiality; and respect for privacy, among them. As the Working Group 
has queried, if counselling records will be disclosed in criminal proceedings, what is the effect 
on an accused or a victim’s participation in child welfare- or family law-related counselling? 
What is the effect of the production of child protection records to an accused on the ability to 
meaningfully assist children in need of protection if confidentiality is not assured? In the 
balancing of multiple interests, it is not at all clear that more information exchange across legal 
systems and proceedings is in women’s interests (indeed, women have asserted their privacy and 
equality interests in a number of criminal and civil cases to resist the sharing of 
records/information).101 These, and other, considerations no doubt also have important 
implications, as the Working Group suggests, for the full disclosure of information necessary for 
adequate risk assessments.  
 Additional challenges arise not through a failure to communicate but, rather, from conflicting 
system mandates and assumptions. This incompatibility has been raised, for example, by family 
law judges in relation to the impact of standard bail conditions – no contact orders – on the 
adjudication of family law matters such as custody, access, and exclusive possession of the 
matrimonial home.102 The no-contact order is intended to prevent harm by prohibiting contact 
(forced relationship exit) and is issued as a matter of course, often over the clear objections of 
women. In this instance, harm is understood in a narrow sense, as arising from contact; prevent 
contact, and women are assumed to be safe. The family court works from an entirely different 
framework in which a child’s contact with both parents is presumptively to be facilitated and 
contact will be prohibited only in exceptional circumstances where a judge is persuaded that it 
would not be in the child’s best interest.103 Fiona Kelly illustrates, through a discussion of the 
case of H.H. v H.C., the markedly different assessments and outcomes across these domains. The 
father, who had been convicted of serious offences against his wife and his in-laws, was granted 
supervised access in the family law realm, while child protection authorities arranged for the 
mother and child to move to another province based on an assessment of risk, and the police 
considered the case a “homicide” prevention file.104 
 A criminal law order takes precedence based on federal paramountcy and not as a result of 
principles designed to best ensure the safety and security of women and children. Justice Bruce 
Pugsley, in his characterization of the standard no-contact order as “rote treatment” devoid of 
                                                            
101  See R v O’Connor, [1995] 4 SCR 411; R v Mills [1999] 3 SCR 668; M (A) v Ryan, [1997] 1 SCR 157. The 
Working Group report addresses a number of these complex questions. Working Group, supra note 30 at 47ff.  
102  Di Luca, Dann & Davies, supra note 71, advise criminal defence counsel that in order to protect the accused’s 
relationship with his children and to prevent the creation of a “status quo” in respect of custody and possession 
of the matrimonial home, the accused may wish to secure reports from an access supervisor (if favorable to the 
accused) and seek an emergency order for specified access if there is supervised access, an order for non-
removal from the jurisdiction, and/or a preservation order (at 21–22).  
103  For a discussion of this expectation, including in cases of violence, see Fiona Kelly, “Enforcing a Parent/Child 
Relationship at All Costs?: Supervised Access Orders in the Canadian Courts” (2011) 49:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 
277. Kelly notes that contact with the father is often characterized as a child’s right, even in circumstances 
where the child opposes contact (at 294 and 305–307). 
104  Ibid at 300–303. 
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professional discretion that “wreaks family law havoc,” would not be the first person to question 
whether this practice is actually in women’s interests.105 It is thus not clear that the routine 
issuance of no-contact orders, or their precedence over family law orders, necessarily makes 
women safer (notwithstanding ongoing concerns that family court judges often pay insufficient 
attention to women’s safety). 
 Indeed, we could identify multiple conflicting mandates among the various legal systems in 
which women may be required to participate: “promote the best interests, protection and well-
being of children”;106 ensure that the stigma of a criminal conviction attaches only when the state 
has met its high burden of proof; promote the “equitable sharing by parents of responsibility for 
their children”;107 recognize “individual responsibility and [promote] self-reliance through 
employment;108 and “permit Canada to pursue the maximum social, cultural and economic 
benefits of immigration, to see that families are reunited in Canada, and to protect public health 
and safety and to maintain the security of Canadian society.”109 Although the safety of women 
has been the stated rationale for a raft of reforms in some number of these systems over the past 
two decades – the creation of specialized domestic violence courts, the introduction of 
mandatory charging and pro-prosecution policies and routine no-contact orders, the development 
of family law reforms in some provinces directing judges to consider domestic violence, and the 
creation of domestic violence exceptions to the application of harsh social assistance and 
immigration policies – none of these regimes is expressly focused on women’s safety.110 And, 
certainly, many women’s experiences of these systems and their interactions are not ones of 
enhanced safety but, rather, quite the opposite. Indeed, the power these systems wield to unravel 
women’s lives has increased significantly in the past decade with changes in their respective 
legal frameworks and the increasing confluences between them – between immigration and 
criminal law (crimmigation), criminal law and social assistance delivery, social assistance and 
immigration, and child welfare and immigration.111  
                                                            
105  Shaw v Shaw, 2008 ONCJ 130. In Shaw, the mother was charged after allegedly hitting her husband and based 
on a phone call with a friend that had been intercepted by her husband during which she joked about solving her 
matrimonial problem with a gun if she could access one. The husband/father went to the police a month later to 
request that she be charged. See also the unpublished Masters’ thesis of Laurence Dominique Lustman, a former 
domestic violence special prosecutor. Laurence Dominique Lustman, “Hearing the Voices of Victims of 
Domestic Violence: Agency, No-Contact Orders, and No-Drop Prosecution” (LLM thesis, Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University, 2008) [unpublished]; Jeannie Suk, At Home in the Law: How the Domestic Violence 
Revolution Is Transforming Privacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). 
106  CFSA, supra note 74, s 1(1) (paramount purpose). 
107  Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, preamble.  
108  Ontario Works Act, 1997, SO 1997, c 25, Schedule A, s 1. 
109  IRPA, supra note 52, ss 3(1), (a), (d), (h), in particular.  
110  Even in relation to criminal justice intervention, there is little evidence that women’s safety is enhanced, and, 
indeed, there is evidence to suggest that for some women the result is an escalation in violence. For a review of 
much of the empirical literature, see Andrew R Klein, “Practical Implications of Current Domestic Violence 
Literature” (research report submitted to the US Department of Justice, 2008), online: National Criminal Justice 
Reference Service <www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222320.pdf>. 
111  Koshan, supra note 38, concluded in her review of integrated domestic violence courts that while there seems to 
be a broad consensus that safety for women has been one of the central goals in their creation, it is often 
“unclear how these goals are defined, to be achieved and measured” and how safety is conceptualized (at 1004).  
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 Changes in immigration law – the introduction of conditional permanent resident status,112 
new criminality and serious criminality provisions, an erosion of family class access to 
Canada,113 the emphasis on enforcement and speedy removal, and the increased use of detention 
– have rendered the ability to remain in Canada more precarious for many women, profoundly 
impacting their safety and security.114 A growing US scholarship documents the dramatic impact 
of immigration reforms that have lowered the threshold for detention and deportation, creating 
what David Thronson has called “involuntary transnational families.”115 A recent report, entitled 
“Shattered Families,” suggests a conservative estimate puts the number of US citizen children in 
foster care at any given time as a result of immigration detention and removal at 5,100.116 
Veronica Thronson’s assessment of US immigration law is equally applicable to the Canadian 
context:  
 
Immigration law itself contributes to the perpetuation of domestic violence … 
women and children are at greater risk for domestic violence not only because of 
their immigration status, but because of way US immigration law is structured … [it] 
                                                            
112  Changes to the regulations in October 2012 created a new category of “conditional permanent residence” status 
for sponsored spouses and cohabiting partners. For those married or in a conjugal relationship for less than two 
years and without children, “permanent residence” was made conditional on the continued cohabitation in a 
conjugal relationship for a two-year period. While an exception was created for abuse and neglect by the 
sponsor, given the challenges of fitting within the exception and the risks should one be found not to fit the 
exception, few applications for the exception have been made. Many women’s advocates have expressed 
concern that this reform has served to more fully entrap women in abusive relationships. See eg the brief of the 
Migrant Mothers Project, “Spousal Sponsorship and Conditional Permanent Residence” (14 January 2016), 
online: Migrant Mothers Project <www.migrantmothersproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/MMP-
Conditional-PR-Policy-Brief-Jan-14-2016.pdf>; CIC, “Operational Bulletin 480 (Modified)” (11 June 2014); 
Pam Hrick, “A Dangerous Step Backwards: The Implications of Conditional Permanent Resident Status for 
Sponsored Immigrant Women in Abusive Relationships” (2012) 21 Dal J Leg Stud 1. The Liberal government 
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puts great power and control in the hands of sponsoring relatives, including abusive 
spouses and parents … [creating] dangerous power dynamics.117 
 
Similarly, reductions in benefit levels, an emphasis on employment, the definition of spouse, and 
a fraud detection regime that encourages anonymous snitching in the social assistance context 
have also served to shore up the power of abusive men.118 Within the child welfare regime, a 
shift from “child welfare” to “child protection” has been critiqued for its focus on the policing of 
“deviant” parents and the blaming of women for “failing” to protect children from exposure to 
domestic violence.119 Legislative changes to the definition of a “child in need of protection” to 
specifically include witnessing domestic violence  or that expand the concept of emotional harm 
(as in Ontario) have resulted in massive increases in reports to, and investigations by, child 
welfare authorities on domestic violence grounds.120 Importantly, these changes in definition 
have similarly expanded reporting requirements for police officers, shelter workers, settlement 
agencies, and others working with women experience abuse. They are, in effect, all part of an 
elaborate network of surveillance.  
 Indeed, surveillance has emerged as a significant feature of modern regulation. Surveillance 
practices began to proliferate with the emergence of the “risk” society, as a means to both 
identify and contain risk. Within the context of neo-liberalism, “risk” is manifest in particular 
ways and by particular bodies. Given neo-liberalism’s emphasis upon “self-reliance” and its 
retreat from social provision, among the riskiest bodies are those that are unattached to the labour 
market or unattached to a male breadwinner. As recipients of Ontario Works benefits, women are 
scrutinized for compliance with a political project to produce self-reliance and family 
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responsibility.121 In the child protection context, mothering is scrutinized for the risks that 
“deficient” mothering poses to children, and in the immigration context, those seeking 
membership are scrutinized for the risk of state dependence and of criminality. While within the 
criminal justice system some women are recognized as genuine victims, as social assistance 
recipients, as mothers involved with child protection agencies, and as persons without status they 
are not victims, but, rather, caricatured and stereotyped as welfare queens, delinquent mothers, 
and bogus claimants abusing Canada’s “generosity.” These caricatures and stereotypes are 
deeply embedded in the systems with which they must often engage, and, thus perhaps not 
surprisingly, women have often drawn explicit parallels between these systems and their abusive 
relationships: the constant monitoring, the fear, the lack of access to information, the 
unpredictability, the derision, the lack of autonomy, and the threats of harm for non-
compliance.122  
 Moreover, these political projects are not always compatible, and women have to answer to 
many masters, who often demand contradictory forms of behaviour: leave the relationship to 
ensure the children do not witness the violence;123 maximize the children’s contact with their 
father; secure employment; remain in the relationship; and stay home to care for the children.124 
And this is why cross-system communication can be a justice-denying experience for many 
women. Not only is the web of surveillance amplified, creating a “surveillant assemblage” that is 
capable of gathering and potentially sharing vast amounts of information, but they confront the 
impossibility of compliance with these incompatible expectations.125 Faced with the prospect of 
information sharing between systems, the surveillance of their performance as mothers, wives, 
workers, and potential citizens by systems with the power to remove their children from their 
care, revoke their status, and remove them from the country, and deny them access to the income 
supports needed to survive, women do their best to avoid these systems.126 It has been well 
documented, for example, that the threat of child welfare involvement – particularly for women 
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in Indigenous and African Canadian communities whose children are over-represented in the 
child welfare system – is the reason women often do not call the police, seek help, or access 
services.127 So too, fear of drastic immigration consequences silences many women and locks 
them in abusive relationships.128  
 Dean Spade argues that while these various legal and administrative systems – criminal 
justice, child welfare, social assistance, immigration – are often held out as offering women 
protection from violence, they function, instead, especially for marginalized women, as sources 
of racialized gender violence.129 The claim that these systems offer protection from violence to 
women is, he suggests, used to justify policies that both fail to provide relief from gender 
violence and create sites of expansion of the systems that enact this racialized gender violence.130 
These state structures and systems not only embolden coercive controllers and facilitate women’s 
entrapment as Stark has argued but also enact their own forms of control over marginalized 
women. As such, the incident-based focus operating within legal systems obscures not only 
patterns of coercive control and how that control is enabled by legal and administrative systems 
but also how legal systems themselves perpetrate racialized gender violence.  
 Clearly, as Spade has argued, this critique shifts our focus from discrete incidents and 
individuals – from specific interactions of multiple systems, conflicting orders, and so on – to 
how “multiple systems … operate simultaneously to produce harms directed not at individuals 
but at entire [marginalized] populations.”131 These insights suggest that increased system 
collaboration and communication may serve to deepen state control of marginalized women, 
erode their autonomy, and silence their voices, rather than enhancing safety, reducing harm, and 
facilitating meaningful access to justice. There is no doubt that many calls for enhanced system 
communication and collaboration are grounded in commitments to women’s safety, dignity, and 
equality. And, similarly, there is little doubt that in individual cases improved communication 
between systems will work to improve women’s safety and enhance access to justice. However, 
these additional insights make clear that as we forge ahead to implement measures intended to 
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improve access to justice, we need to anticipate the “unintended consequences” that may 




 Conceptualizing access to justice from the perspective of women abused in their intimate 
relationships must proceed from women’s experiences, alive to the ways in which substantive 
law and legal processes may unequally distribute meaningful access to justice among women. As 
I have argued, building knowledge and understanding of domestic violence so that all legal 
system actors appreciate the tactics and dynamics of coercive control is essential. Without this 
appreciation, significant risks to women’s physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being will 
remain obscured from view, as will the strategic use of legal systems and processes by coercive 
controllers to tighten their grip on power. Legal actors need understand not only how legal 
proceedings are manipulated by coercive controllers in their desperation to hold onto power but 
also how administrative systems are deployed to the same end. In this regard, the impact of 
recent developments in the United Kingdom, where the paradigm of coercive control has been 
legislatively embraced, including through the introduction of a new criminal offence, will be 
important to watch in order to determine whether women’s access to justice is improved.133 
 It is no doubt clear, given the serious issues at stake and the complex, and often opaque, 
systems that women must navigate in seeking safety, that access to legal representation is 
tremendously important. While access to legal information may be a constituent element of 
access to justice, it is not a substitute for the skillful and knowledgeable legal representative that 
women require.134 This skill and knowledge extends beyond understanding the dynamics of 
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abuse to also include the multi-layered and interlocking systems that shape women’s lives as 
they seek to end the violence in their lives.  
 As suggested, we need to also develop access to justice reforms with a view to avoiding 
unintended consequences. More particularly, with a view to carefully considering whether 
proposed reforms, including those designed to improve cross-system coordination and 
collaboration, enlarge male, or state, control over women and put women’s safety and well-being 
at risk. Two recent projects, one in Australia and another in Ontario, offer some interesting 
possibilities as to how we might go about this. The Australian Law Reform Commission released 
a mammoth 600-page report in 2011 entitled Family Violence and Commonwealth Laws: 
Improving Legal Frameworks, which examines the legal treatment of “family violence” across a 
range of areas of law: child support, family assistance, immigration, employment, social security, 
superannuation, and privacy.135 These areas of law and their intersections were assessed against 
the touchstone of “safety,” defined not only as safety from harm but also as access to financial 
security and independence. In addition, the review identified seven guiding principles: 
seamlessness (from the point of view of those who engage with the law); accessibility (to legal 
and other responses and elaborated to include the avoidance of re-traumatization and 
consequential under-reporting), fairness (defined to include, among other considerations, that 
applicable system requirements not exacerbate safety concerns and that concerns about safety are 
properly heard and understood), effectiveness (here again with attention to understanding the 
reluctance to disclose), self-agency or autonomy, privacy, and system integrity (to ensure that, 
where a benefit or beneficial outcome is included in the relevant laws, any requirements to verify 
family violence are appropriate to the benefit sought).136  
 The Ontario “Policies Matter” project, undertaken by feminist advocacy organizations, maps 
the intersecting policy regimes that impact abused women against proxy indicators for women’s 
safety.137 As in the Australian Law Reform Commission report, “safety” is conceptualized not 
only as freedom from physical violence but also as access to income security, to safe and 
affordable housing, to supports, and to legal representation, as freedom from discrimination, and 
as the maintenance of caring relationships with children and community.138  
 Without suggesting that these projects have by any means produced definitive definitions of 
safety or of the guiding principles, what they do offer is a methodological approach as we move 
forward in the development of responses to the “crisis” in access to justice. They reveal the 
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importance of a careful, systematic consideration of various legal regimes and their intersections 
against the benchmarks of women’s safety, understood more expansively than freedom from 
physical violence. It is also abundantly clear that this careful consideration requires the 
participation of diverse groups of women in developing these benchmarks, evaluating legal 
frameworks, and predicting the consequences of potential reforms. As Canada’s leading access 
to justice scholar, the late Roderick Macdonald, has so eloquently reminded us in his work, 
access to justice requires meaningful participation in all of the forums where law is constituted 
and justice is sought and not simply clearing the path of obstructions blocking access to the doors 
of the courthouse.139  
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